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Abstract
The credibility of standard instrumental variables assumptions is often under dispute.
This paper imposes weak monotonicity in order to gain information on counterfactual out-
comes, but avoids independence or exclusion restrictions. The outcome process is assumed
to be sequentially ordered, building up and depending on the information level of agents.
The potential outcome distribution is assumed to weakly increase (or decrease) with the
instrument, conditional on the continuation up to a certain stage. As a general result, the
counterfactual distributions can only be bounded, but the derived bounds are informative
compared to the no-assumptions bounds thus justifying the instrumental variables termi-
nology. The construction of bounds is illustrated in two data examples.
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1 Introduction
The empirical evaluation of interventions is a major task of economic policy-making. One
might be interested, for example, in the effect of a supplementation policy on the education
outcomes of children in disadvantaged families (e.g., Brooks-Gunn 2003), or in the effect of
schooling on fertility (e.g., Sander 1992). The potential outcomes framework (Rubin 1974)
has become a popular tool to assess such interventions. More formally, let Y (s) denote the
potential outcome in state s ∈ S, and let P [Y (s)] denote the distribution of outcomes that
would occur if everybody in the population was observed in state s. The study of policy effects
compares the potential outcome distributions in different states, invoking assumptions on the
nature of the data-generating process and the information available to agents.
The central issues in this framework are twofold. First, treatment states are generally
subject to choice, e.g., a family can decide whether or not to accept a financial aid. Second,
the realized outcome of each individual is only observed in the actual state, the outcomes that
would occur in alternative states are logically unobserved. As a result, the commonly defined
policy effects are fundamentally unidentified (Manski 1994, 2000, 2007, Heckman and Vytlacil
2007a, 2007b, among others). Possible solutions require assumptions on the data-generating
process, either by specifying a parametric model on the potential outcomes (e.g., Haavelmo
1943, Roy 1951, Heckman and Honore´ 1990, Heckman 2001, Heckman and Vytlacil 2005),
or by restricting the attention to some features of the population, such as the mean or the
median, and using the observed data combined with some less restrictive assumptions to infer
these parameters (e.g., Imbens and Angrist 1995, Angrist et al. 1996). As a third alternative,
one may impose bounds on the policy effects of interest under weak assumptions on the data
structure (e.g., Manski 1990, 1997, Manski and Pepper 2000, Shaikh and Vytlacil 2005).
This paper follows the latter strategy. It focuses on outcomes that are measured on a
discrete ordinal scale with the agent’s information set being generated by a sequential mecha-
nism. The sequential structure is motivated by an economic model of transitions, where certain
responses are only observed given positive outcomes in the antecedent responses (Amemiya
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1975, 1985). In this model, one may introduce latent variables that represent marginal returns,
based on the net lifetime reward from stopping at some stage (Cunha et al. 2007, Carneiro et
al. 2003). The optimal stopping time is then characterized by that stage when marginal returns
are just above zero, and the marginal returns for all adjacent stages are negative. Examples
include schooling outcomes (Steele et al. 2009), the number of children (Zhang 1994), the
number of unemployment spells (Kahn and Morimune 1979), and the labor force participation
of women (Heckman and Willis 1977).
In order to gain information on the counterfactual outcome distributions, weak assump-
tions are imposed on the sequential decision process. In a first step, I will explore monotone
instrumental variables (MIV) assumptions in the manner of Manski and Pepper (2000, 2009)
but extended to incorporate stochastic dominance. In a second step, I will relax these assump-
tions to allow for partially monotone instrumental variables (PMIV), taking into account the
information set in each stage. As a general result, the counterfactual distributions can only be
bounded, with the width of bounds depending on the strength of the underlying assumptions.
To the best of my knowledge, the PMIV approach is new in the literature.
The analysis is somewhat related to the dynamic treatment literature due to the sequential
ordering of outcomes (e.g., Robins 1989, 1997, Lechner and Miquel 2009, Gill and Robins 2001,
Lechner 2008, 2009, Abbring and Van Den Berg 2003, Navarro and Heckman 2007, Abbring and
Heckman 2007). However, it differs from that literature in the nature of the data-generating
process. Here, potential outcomes arise from a sequential model with available information
depending on previous experience (or outcomes). The model is static in the sense that the
intervention only occurs and affects choices at a particular point in time. The approach also
differs from Boes (2007) who imposes a multiple threshold crossing model that generates the
ordered potential outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a heuristic outline of
the analysis. Section 3 develops the concept of PMIV and derives bounds on the counterfactual
distributions. Section 4 illustrates the construction of bounds using a simulated and a real
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data example. The empirical application considers how the number of children born to a
woman varies with realized schooling, under the assumption that fertility decisions are based on
both current circumstances and experiences with previously born children (Zhang 1994). This
example will appear throughout the text in order to motivate the MIV and PMIV assumptions.
Section 5 summarizes the results and concludes.
2 Heuristic Derivation of Bounds
A simple example with J = 3 ordered responses illustrates the strategy of the paper. Let S ∈ S
denote the state in which an individual is observed, and let Y = Y (S) denote the realized
outcome with Y ∈ Y = {1, ..., J}. Outcomes are ordered such that 1 < ... < J , although the
distance between outcomes does not necessarily have an interpretation. The observed data
are the triple (Y, S,X) of realized outcomes Y , realized states S, and covariates X ∈ X . The
problem is to learn the distribution of potential outcomes P [Y (s)] ∀s ∈ S, perhaps conditional
on X, from the observed distribution P (Y, S,X). Consider the distribution of outcomes in
state s
P [Y (s)] = P [Y |S = s]P (S = s) + P [Y (s)|S 6= s]P (S 6= s), (1)
which follows by the law of total probability and the observation rule for Y . The potential
outcome Y (s) is not observed for individuals not in s, and thus the (counterfactual) distribution
P [Y (s)|S 6= s] is not identified from the observed data. All other quantities are identified. By
definition of a probability, it must hold that P [Y (s)|S 6= s] ∈ [0, 1] which yields an identification
region for the distribution of Y (s) (Manski 1995, 2003).
Now rewrite the distribution in terms of conditional transition probabilities, formally
P [Y (s) = y] ≡ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y]P [Y (s) ≥ y], ∀y ∈ Y. All the assumptions on the
data-generating process will be stated with respect to the transition probabilities P [Y (s) =
y|Y (s) ≥ y], reflecting the information that agents have when deciding upon the outcome of
4
interest. Consider the counterfactual distribution with J = 3 outcomes:
P [Y (s) = 1|S 6= s] = P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S 6= s] (2)
P [Y (s) = 2|S 6= s] = P [Y (s) = 2|Y (s) ≥ 2, S 6= s]
·{1− P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S 6= s]}
P [Y (s) = 3|S 6= s] =
2∏
j=1
{1− P (Y (s) = j|Y (s) ≥ j, S 6= s]}.
Without imposing further assumptions on the data-generating process, each of the conditional
transition probabilities must lie within the unit interval, and thus
P [Y (s) = y|S 6= s] ∈ [0, 1] ∀y ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (3)
These are the no-assumptions bounds mentioned above. Now assume that the conditional
transition probability for the lowest category can be restricted due to some additional infor-
mation, but there are no restrictions on the transition from the second to the third category
(given the information from the first). This implies
P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S 6= s] ∈ [αl, αu] (4)
P [Y (s) = 2|Y (s) ≥ 2, S 6= s] ∈ [0, 1].
In this case, bounds on the unidentified probability distribution can be derived as follows:
P [Y (s) = 1|S 6= s] ∈ [αl, αu] (5)
P [Y (s) = 2|S 6= s] ∈ [0, 1 − αl]
P [Y (s) = 3|S 6= s] ∈ [0, 1 − αl].
The assumption imposed in the left part of the outcome distribution, in terms of the conditional
transition probability, passes through to all subsequent (unconditional) probabilities and thus
is informative also for the right part of the outcome distribution. Analogous arguments hold
if additional restrictions are imposed on P [Y (s) = 2|Y (s) ≥ 2, S 6= s]. The next two sections
discuss weak (but credible) assumptions on the data-generating process that can be invoked
to bound the conditional transition probabilities.
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3 (Partially) Monotone Instrumental Variables
Manski and Pepper (2000, 2009) introduce monotone instrumental variables (MIV) in order to
weaken conventional instrumental variables (IV) assumptions. IV assumptions typically im-
pose mean or full independence of the response variable and the instrument. MIV assumptions
replace the equality of mean outcomes (or outcome distributions) of standard IV methods by
a weak inequality conditional on the instrument. This section further develops the idea in
the context of an ordered discrete outcome model with sequential update of information. The
notation follows Manski and Pepper (2000, 2009).
Let X = (W,V ) and X = W × V. Each value of (W,V ) characterizes a subpopulation of
individuals. Standard IV methods state that V is an instrument if the distribution of outcomes
for each s ∈ S conditional on W does not change with different values of V . Formally, the IV
assumptions may relate to the entire distribution or the conditional transition probabilities:
Assumption (IV1). Covariate V is an IV in the sense of conditional independence in the
distribution of Y if, for each y ∈ Y, s ∈ S, W ∈ W, and all u1, u2 ∈ V × V,
P [Y (s) = y|W,V = u1] = P [Y (s) = y|W,V = u2]. (6)
Assumption (IV2). Covariate V is an IV in the sense of conditional independence in the
transition probabilities if, for each y ∈ Y, s ∈ S, W ∈ W, and all u1, u2 ∈ V × V,
P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y,W, V = u1] = P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y,W, V = u2]. (7)
Now assume that V is an ordered set. A distributional equivalent to the MIV assumption
of Manski and Pepper (2000) would be that the distribution of Y (s) for all individuals with a
specified W and value u1 of V weakly dominates the distribution of Y (s) for individuals with
the same W but with u2 ≥ u1, (u2, u1) ∈ V. Formally:
Assumption (MIV1). Covariate V is an IV in the sense of weak stochastic dominance if, for
each y ∈ Y, s ∈ S, W ∈ W, and all u1, u2 ∈ V × V with u1 ≤ u2,
P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u1] ≥ P [Y (s) ≤ y|W,V = u2]. (8)
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An assumption of this type is explored in greater detail in Boes (2009). In the context of
this paper and the sequential mechanism generating the outcomes, it is more reasonable to
specify the MIV assumption in terms of transition probabilities.
Assumption (MIV2). Covariate V is an IV in the sense of weak stochastic dominance in the
transition probabilities if, for each y ∈ Y, s ∈ S, W ∈ W, and all u1, u2 ∈ V ×V with u1 ≤ u2,
P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y,W, V = u1] ≥ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y,W, V = u2]. (9)
In order to illustrate how the assumptions IV1 and MIV1 differ, consider the following
example with outcome of interest the number of children born to a woman, S the woman’s
schooling, and V measured marital attractiveness. For V to serve as an instrument in the sense
of IV1, we must assume that the distribution of children for schooling level s is the same for
women with a high attractiveness than for women with a low attractiveness. Assumption MIV1
states that less attractive women tend to have a higher probability of getting few children,
and more attractive women tend to have a higher probability of getting many children. If
attractivenss is a complement to child-rearing, then the latter assumption is consistent with
economic theory (e.g., Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984), assumption IV1 is not.
Likewise, assumption IV2 claims that the probability of having y children, given at least y
children, is the same for those women who are less attractive and those women who are more
attractive in the marital market. Assumption MIV2 states that this probability is weakly
higher for less attractive women than for more attractive women. In the language of discrete
hazard models (Lancaster 1990), the probability of a drop-out at a certain stage (where stage
is a particular number of children), conditional on survival up to this stage (i.e., having at
least that many children), is weakly higher for the less attractive women than for the more
attractive women.
The focus here is on the implications of assumption MIV2. In order to simplify the notation,
I will drop W , but all expressions are implicitly assumed conditional on W . MIV2 implies for
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any u ∈ V with u1 ≤ u ≤ u2 that
P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u2] ≤ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u] (10)
≤ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u1], ∀y ∈ Y.
Thus, a lower bound of P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u2] is also a lower bound of P [Y (s) =
y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u], and an upper bound of P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u1] is also an upper
bound of P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u]. This must hold for all values u1 ≤ u and must hold for
all values u2 ≥ u. Exploiting the full support of V , one can impose bounds on the distribution
of potential outcomes:
Proposition 1. Let assumption MIV2 hold. Then for all y ∈ Y and any u ∈ V,
sup
u2≥u
{P [Y = y|Y ≥ y, S = s, V = u2]P (S = s|V = u2)} (11)
≤ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u] ≤
inf
u1≤u
{P [Y = y|Y ≥ y, S = s, V = u1]P (S = s|V = u1) + P (S 6= s|V = u1)}.
In the absence of other information, these bounds are sharp.
Bounds on P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y] can be obtained by integrating out over the support of
V (subject to conditions of measurability). Proposition 1 is similar to the one in Manski and
Pepper (2000), taking into account that probabilities are equivalent to expectations of value
indicators of Y . It differs from the proposition in Manski and Pepper in the conditioning
argument, reflecting the sequential update of information in the data-generating process.
It is exactly the sequential structure that can be explored to further relax the monotone
instrumental variables assumptions. More specifically, there is no need to impose weak domi-
nance throughout the entire support of Y , and one might relax assumption MIV2 to a partially
monotone instrumental variables (PMIV) assumption. Two versions of the PMIV assumptions
can be stated. These are:
Assumption (PMIV1). Covariate V is an IV in the sense of partially weak stochastic dom-
inance with monotone switch in the transition probabilities if, for each y ∈ Y, s ∈ S, W ∈ W,
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and all u1, u2 ∈ V × V with u1 ≤ u2,
P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u1] ≥ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u2], y ≤ t (12)
P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u1] ≤ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u2], y > t
where t ∈ Y is a fixed threshold value.
Assumption (PMIV2). Covariate V is an IV in the sense of partially weak stochastic dom-
inance in the transition probabilities if, for y, y′ ∈ Y × Y and y 6= y′, and for each s ∈ S,
W ∈ W, and all u1, u2 ∈ V × V with u1 ≤ u2,
P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u1] ≥ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u2], (13)
P [Y (s) = y′|Y (s) ≥ y′, V = u1] ≤ P [Y (s) = y
′|Y (s) ≥ y′, V = u2].
In order to illustrate assumptions PMIV1 and PMIV2, consider the schooling and fertility
example again. Assumption PMIV1 states that the probability of getting a low number of
children (y ≤ t, for some fixed t), given the information from previously born children (if
any), is weakly higher for the less attractive women (V = u1) compared to the more attractive
women (V = u2). The drop-out rate given a high number of children (y > t), however, may
be higher for the more attractive women than the less attractive women, e.g., due to the
counteraction of income and substitution effects (again see Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984). If
there does not exist a unique threshold t at which the order of weak inequalities changes (e.g.,
due to the characteristics of the population), then there might be some y ∈ Y where the drop-
out rate is higher for the more attractive women, and some other y′ ∈ Y where the drop-out
rate is higher for the less attractive women, without particular order. The latter is consistent
with assumption PMIV2.
Since PMIV1 is a special case of PMIV2, only the implications of the latter will be discussed
(with the implications of the former being immediate). Given assumption PMIV2 it must hold
that for any u ∈ V with u1 ≤ u ≤ u2 and y, y
′ ∈ Y ×Y, y 6= y′ as specified by the assumption,
P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u1] ≥ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u] (14)
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≥ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u2],
P [Y (s) = y′|Y (s) ≥ y′, V = u1] ≤ P [Y (s) = y
′|Y (s) ≥ y′, V = u] (15)
≤ P [Y (s) = y′|Y (s) ≥ y′, V = u2].
Thus, it follows from (14) that a lower bound of P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u2] is also a lower
bound of P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u], and an upper bound of P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u1]
is also an upper bound of P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u]. This must hold for all u1 ≤ u and
all u2 ≥ u. Similar arguments, but with opposite signs, hold for the transition probabilities of
category y′ 6= y as captured by the second part of assumption PMIV2 and (15). Exploiting
the full support of V yields:
Proposition 2. Let assumption PMIV2 hold. Then for any u ∈ V,
sup
u2≥u
{P [Y = y|Y ≥ y, S = s, V = u2]P (S = s|V = u2)} (16)
≤ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u] ≤
inf
u1≤u
{P [Y = y|Y ≥ y, S = s, V = u1]P (S = s|V = u1) + P (S 6= s|V = u1)},
and
sup
u1≤u
{P [Y = y′|Y ≥ y′, S = s, V = u1]P (S = s|V = u1)} (17)
≤ P [Y (s) = y′|Y (s) ≥ y′, V = u] ≤
inf
u2≥u
{P [Y = y′|Y ≥ y′, S = s, V = u2]P (S = s|V = u2) + P (S 6= s|V = u2)}.
In the absence of other information, these bounds are sharp.
Proposition 2 consists of two parts that reflect the different information on the sequential
decision process, depending on the outcome level itself. (16) is derived from the first part of
PMIV2 and the inequalities in (14). The bounds in (17) are derived from the second part of
PMIV2 and the inequalities in (15). Since no other assumptions on the data-generating process
are imposed than PMIV2, it is difficult to draw general conclusions regarding the properties
of the bounds. Nevertheless, some remarks can be made. First, the bounds in (16) are not
10
informative if the lower and upper no-assumptions bounds on P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u]
weakly decrease with u, in which case they coincide with the no-assumptions bounds. Second,
the bounds coincide with the standard IV bounds (under IV2) if the no-assumptions lower and
upper bounds on P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u] weakly increase with u. The opposite holds
for the second part of proposition 2, i.e., the stated bounds coincide with the no-assumptions
bounds (with the IV2 bounds) if the lower and upper no-assumptions bounds on P [Y (s) =
y|Y (s) ≥ y, V = u] weakly increase (decrease) with u.
Monotone treatment selection
A special case is obtained if V is the treatment indicator itself. Assumption IV1 then states
that the potential outcome distribution is the same irrespective of the treatment status, for-
mally P [Y (s)|S = u1] = P [Y (s)|S = u2] for all u1, u2 ∈ S × S. This the exogenous treatment
selection assumption known from the literature (e.g., Manski and Pepper 2000). Note that
further covariates W are kept implicit in the conditioning part. Now suppose that S is an
ordered set and V = S. In this case assumptions MIV1, MIV2, PMIV1, and PMIV2 relax
the exogenous treatment selection assumption to monotone treatment selection (MTS) as-
sumptions (cf. Manski and Pepper 2000), or partially monotone treatment selection (PMTS)
assumptions. For example, assumption MIV2 states that the drop-out rate for those with a
low value of S is weakly higher than the drop-out rate for those with a high value of S. Like-
wise, assumption PMIV2 states that the sign of the weak inequality between drop-out rates
depends on the outcome level.
The following corollary summarizes the results under the partially monotone treatment
selection version of assumption PMIV2:
Corollary 1. Let S be an ordered set and let assumption PMIV2 hold for V = S. Then, for
any u ∈ S the bounds in Proposition 2 reduce to
u < s ⇒ P (Y = y|Y ≥ y, S = s) ≤ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, S = u] ≤ 1 (18)
u = s ⇒ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, S = u] = P (Y = y|Y ≥ y, S = s)
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u > s ⇒ 0 ≤ P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, S = u] ≤ P (Y = y|Y ≥ y, S = s)
and
u < s ⇒ 0 ≤ P [Y (s) = y′|Y (s) ≥ y′, S = u] ≤ P (Y = y′|Y ≥ y′, S = s) (19)
u = s ⇒ P [Y (s) = y′|Y (s) ≥ y′, S = u] = P (Y = y′|Y ≥ y′, S = s)
u > s ⇒ P (Y = y′|Y ≥ y′, S = s) ≤ P [Y (s) = y′|Y (s) ≥ y′, S = u] ≤ 1
In the absence of further information, these bounds are sharp.
Corollary 1 provides informative upper or lower bounds on the counterfactual transition
probabilities, and point identification if u = s. The bounds are informative also with respect to
the unconditional distribution P [Y (s)], ∀s ∈ S following the arguments outlined in Section 2.
The MIV and PMIV assumptions with V = S thus have identifying power on the distributions
of interest, but relax the standard exogeneity assumptions often imposed in the literature.
The following section motivates the PMIV assumptions within a structural model context and
illustrates the construction of bounds in a simple simulated data environment.
4 Illustrations
4.1 Simulated Data Example
Suppose a simple structural model with two treatment states (S = {0, 1}), J = 3 outcomes,
and no covariates, that reflects the information structure of agents in the decision process:
S = I(ν ≥ α) (20)
Y (s) = 1 if ε1 ≤ τs,1, s = 0, 1
Y (s) = 2 if ε2 ≤ τs,2 and ε1 > τs,1
Y (s) = 3 if ε2 > τs,2 and ε1 > τs,1,
where I(A) is the logical indicator function that returns 1 if A is true. The selection process is
modelled as a binary choice problem, the outcome process is modelled as a sequence of binary
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choices, one for each step, conditional on the continuation up to this step. Only the pair (Y, S)
is observed, where Y = Y (S).
The structural model in (20) does not impose a-priori restrictions on the joint distribution
of (ν, ε1, ε2), and in particular on the correlations between the error term of the selection
process and the error terms of the outcome processes (except for common regularity conditions
such as finite and positive definite covariance matrix). Moreover, the model allows for arbitrary
behavioral assumptions on the sequential decisions since no a-priori assumptions are imposed
on the correlation between the error terms in each step. The parameters α and τ are thresholds
that determine the propensity to be selected into one of the two states, and the likelihood of
dropping out of the sequential process in a perticular stage in each of the two states.
The model as presented in (20) imposes the restriction that the error terms in both states
are generated by the same process. This assumption substantially simplifies the illustration
below, by allowing to focus on the influence of the main parameters on the construction and
properties of the bounds, but it can be relaxed in further analyses such that ε does also carry
a subscript s. The model can be extended to allow for covariates X by making α and τs,y,
∀s, y functions of X. However, in line with the notion of the paper, the model avoids exclusion
restrictions (i.e, non-overlapping subsets of X appear in α and τ), such that accounting for
covariates amounts to defining treatment effects (and deriving bounds) for subpopulations
described by X.
In order to illustrate the construction of bounds, the error terms (ν, ε1, ε2) are assumed
jointly normal with zero means and covariance matrix
Σ =


1 σν,1 σν,2
σν,1 1 σ1,2
σν,2 σ1,2 1

 .
The threshold values in state s = 0 are fixed at τ0,1 = 0.8 and τ0,2 = 0.3, and the construction
of bounds is illustrated if one of α, σν,1, σν,2, σ1,2, τ1,1, or τ1,2 is varied. Table 1 provides
an overview of the design. Each of the following six figures shows the true potential outcome
distribution, the no-assumptions lower and upper bounds, and the lower and upper bounds of
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Proposition 2/Corollary 1, assuming no uncertainty about the sign of the inequalities.
— Insert Table 1 about here —
Figure 1 displays the potential outcome distribution if α is varied from -2 to 2 (and all
other parameters are fixed as shown in Table 1). Here, and in the following figures, the upper
two diagrams show the probability that the potential outcome takes value 1 in state 1 (on
the left) and in state 0 (on the right). The middle and bottom diagrams show the according
probabilities for outcomes 2 and 3, respectively. Since α does only affect the selection status
but does not affect the potential outcome process, the true outcome probabilities in each of
the two states are constant (indicated by the thick black line). The construction and the
properties of the bounds, however, depend on the value of α because only (Y, S) is observed.
— Insert Figure 1 about here —
Consider outcome 1 in state 1. The potential outcome probability can be written as
P [Y (1) = 1] = P (S = 1, Y = 1) + P [Y (1) = 1|S = 0]P (S = 0) by the law of total probability
and the observation rule for Y . The no-assumptions bounds, indicated by the small grey
circles and triangles, impose P [Y (1) = 1|S = 0] ∈ (0, 1) by the definition of a probability. The
bounds on P [Y (1) = 1] are relatively tight if P (S = 0) is small, and relatively wide if P (S = 0)
is large. The former case is associated with α small, the latter with α large, as shown in the
figure. Analogous arguments hold for the no-assumptions bounds and outcome levels 2 and
3. The role of α is reversed if the potential outcome probabilities in state 0 are considered,
with the bounds being relatively wide if P (S = 1) is large (or α small) and the bounds being
relatively tight if P (S = 0) is small (or α large).
Now consider the bounds derived in Proposition 2/Corollary 1 (indicated by the large
hollow circles and triangles). These bounds are often tighter, and never wider, than the no-
assumptions bounds, which can be explained as follows. By the assumption of normality,
σν,1 = 0.3, and σν,2 = 0.5 it follows that P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S = 0] > P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥
1, S = 1] and P [Y (s) = 2|Y (s) ≥ 2, S = 0] > P [Y (s) = 2|Y (s) ≥ 2, S = 1] for s = 0, 1.
14
The former is implied by σν,1 being positive, the latter by the joint set of assumptions. It
follows from the former that A1 ≡ P (Y = 1|Y ≥ 1, S = 1) can be used as a lower bound
for P [Y (1) = 1|Y (1) ≥ 1, S = 0] instead of zero, and B1 ≡ P (Y = 1|Y ≥ 1, S = 0) can
be used as an upper bound for P [Y (0) = 1|Y (0) ≥ 1, S = 1] instead of one. Moreover,
A2 ≡ P (Y = 2|Y ≥ 2, S = 1) can be used as a lower bound for P [Y (1) = 2|Y (1) ≥ 2, S = 0]
instead of zero, and B2 ≡ P (Y = 2|Y ≥ 2, S = 0) can be used as an upper bound for
P [Y (0) = 2|Y (0) ≥ 2, S = 1] instead of one.
Since the counterfactual probability for outcome 1 in state 1 can be written as P [Y (1) =
1|S = 0] = P [Y (1) = 1|Y (1) ≥ 1, S = 0], it lies in the interval (A1, 1) by the argument above.
Thus, the lower bound on P [Y (1) = 1] is shifted upwards compared to the no-assumptions
lower bound, and the upper bound remains the same. For outcome 2, write P [Y (1) = 2|S =
0] = P [Y (1) = 2|Y (1) ≥ 2, S = 0]{1 − P [Y (1) = 1|Y (1) ≥ 1, S = 0]} which lies in the interval
(0, A2(1 − A1)). Thus, the upper bound on P [Y (1) = 2] is smaller than the no-assumptions
upper bound and the lower bound remains the same. The potential outcome probability for
the highest category 3 can be written as P [Y (1) = 3|S = 0] = {1− P [Y (1) = 2|Y (1) ≥ 2, S =
0]}{1 − P [Y (1) = 1|Y (1) ≥ 1, S = 0]} which lies in the interval (0, (1 − A1)(1 − A2)) by the
assumptions above, and thus again only the upper bound is shifted downwards.
Analogous arguments hold for the three outcomes in state 0. The counterfactual probability
for outcome 1 lies in the interval (0, B1), it lies in the interval (0, B2) for outcome 2, and in
the interval ((1 −B1)(1 −B2), 1) for outcome 3. Thus, in comparison to the no-assumptions
bounds, the upper bounds as implied by Proposition 2/Corollary 1 are shifted downwards for
the outcome levels 1 and 2, and the lower bound is shifted upwards for the outcome level 3.
The magnitude of the shift depends on the magnitude of B1 and B2, as well as the selection
probability P (S = 1) (which depends on α).
In the setup of the simulation, the width of the bounds as implied by Proposition 2/Corol-
lary 1 is substantially smaller than the no-assumptions bounds for all outcomes in state 1,
while the information gain in terms of width is less pronounced for state 0. This result is
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not determined by a single parameter but by the overall setup of the study and the imposed
assumptions on the parameters.
Figure 2 displays the results if the correlation between the error term in the selection
process and the error term of the first step in the sequential process, σν,1, is varied from -0.5
to 0.5. If there is no selection on unobservables in the first step of the sequential process, i.e.,
if σν,1 = 0, then the counterfactual probabilities become point identified because P [Y (s) =
1|S = 0] = P [Y (s) = 1|S = 1] for s = 0, 1. This is indicated in the graph at that point when
the large hollow circle and triangle coincide with the true outcome probability (the thick black
line). If σν,1 is negative (positive), then
P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S = 0] < (>)P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S = 1], s = 0, 1
In all cases, P [Y (s) = 2|Y (s) ≥ 2, S = 0] > P [Y (s) = 2|Y (s) ≥ 2, S = 1] for s = 0, 1 by the
assumptions of the setup. This example is interesting for the comparison of PMTS and MTS.
If σν,1 is positive, then the two are equivalent. However, if σν,1 is negative, then the MTS
assumption is violated while the PMTS assumption is not.
— Insert Figure 2 about here —
According to Proposition 2/Corollary 1, the counterfactual probabilities in state 1 and in
the case of σν,1 negative can be bounded by P [Y (1) = 1|S = 0] ∈ (0, A1), P [Y (1) = 2|S =
0] ∈ (A2(1 − A1), 1), and P [Y (1) = 3|S = 0] ∈ (0, 1 − A2), and in state 0, the bounds can
be derived as P [Y (0) = 1|S = 1] ∈ (B1, 1), P [Y (1) = 2|S = 0] ∈ (0, B2(1 − B1)), and
P [Y (1) = 3|S = 0] ∈ (0, 1−B1). If σν,1 is positive, then the bounds are the same as the ones
described above when α is varied.
Comparing the two cases σν,1 positive and σν,1 negative, it can be observed that there
is no uni-directional shift in the bounds compared to the no-assumptions case. The sign
and magnitude of the shift depends on all parameters such that no general conclusion can
be drawn, even from this simple model. However, compared to the no-assumptions case,
the information gain can be substantial, cutting the possible range of the potential outcome
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distribution by more than a third (e.g., for outcomes 2 and 3 in state 0). Thus, while the
weak monotonicity assumption may not always have point-identifying power, it is nevertheless
informative regarding the outcome process. As a further result, the bounds derived by wrongly
imposing the MTS assumption may not always include the true probability given PMTS. In
the given example, this happens for P [Y (1) = 3] and P [Y (0) = 3], and σν,1 about -0.2.
Figure 3 displays the results when σν,2 is varied from -0.5 to 0.5. A variation in σν,2 does
not alter the first stage in the sequential process, and since σν,1 is assumed to be positive (Table
1), the potential transition probabilities fulfill the assumption P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S = 0] >
P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S = 1], s = 0, 1. The setup is chosen such that there is a unique shift in
the sign of the inequalities for the potential transition probabilities for the second category at
σν,2 ≈ 0.112. If σν,2 < 0.112, then P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S = 0] < P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S = 1]
for s = 0, 1, and if σν,2 > 0.112, then P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S = 0] > P [Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥
1, S = 1] for s = 0, 1. While the latter case is analogous to the scenario when α is varied, the
former case implies the following bounds on the counterfactual probabilities:
P [Y (1) = 1|S = 0] ∈ (A1, 1)
P [Y (1) = 2|S = 0] ∈ (0, A2(1 −A1))
P [Y (1) = 3|S = 0] ∈ (0, 1−A1)
and
P [Y (0) = 1|S = 1] ∈ (0, B1)
P [Y (0) = 2|S = 1] ∈ (B2(1−B1), 1)
P [Y (0) = 3|S = 1] ∈ (0, 1−B2)
Thus, in state 1 the lower bound is shifted upwards for outcome 1, and the upper bounds are
shifted downwards for outcomes 2 and 3 compared to the no-assumptions bounds. In state 0,
the lower bound is identical to the no-assumptions lower bound for outcomes 1 and 3 while
the upper bound is smaller, and the opposite holds for outcome 2.
— Insert Figure 3 about here —
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The different role of the information set in the construction of bounds should be noted
when comparing Figures 2 and 3. For example, the sign of the correlation between the first
step error term and the error term of the selection process affects the bounds in all outcome
categories. If economic theory is informative regarding the sign of the correlation, then this
affects the information available on the entire outcome distribution. The correlation between
the second step error term and the selection error term does not affect the probability of the
lower outcome 1 (due to the sequential structure of the model), and thus is only informative on
the same and the subsequent categories. The magnitude of the information gain depends on the
particular characteristics of the model (i.e., the covariance matrix, the threshold parameters,
and the number of outcomes), but any weak information that can be credibly imposed on
these determinants can be successfully employed to derive bounds on the potential outcome
distribution that are tighter than the no-assumptions bounds.
The last three figures display the results when the correlation between the first step and
the second step error term (σ1,2) is varied (Figure 4), and the threshold parameters τ1,1 and
τ1,2 are varied (Figures 5 and 6). In all cases, the setup of the study ensures conformability
with the PMIV assumptions in the sense that P [Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, S = 0] > P [Y (s) =
y|Y (s) ≥ y, S = 1] for s = 0, 1 and y = 1, 2 such that the construction of bounds is analogous
to the case when α is varied. It should be noted that while τ1,1 and τ1,2 are the threshold
parameters in state 1, they also affect the bounds on the potential outcome distribution in
state 0 because they affect what is observed by the researcher and what assumptions can be
imposed on the potential conditional transition probabilities. While this information does not
vary with τ1,1 and τ1,2, it is already sufficient to obtain bounds that are more informative than
the no-assumptions bounds.
— Insert Figures 4 to 6 about here —
If X covariates are present, then the construction of the bounds as presented above is local
(conditional on X) and the overall bounds (unconditional on X) can be obtained as a weighted
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average. The PMIV assumptions that can be imposed in each sub-population described by
X may differ such that either more informative upper bounds or more informative lower
bounds can be imposed, conditional on X. It is also consistent with the concept of the PMIV
assumptions if for some sub-populations no additional information can be invoked and hence
the no-assumptions bounds still apply.
4.2 Schooling and Fertility
As an empirical example, I will consider how the number of children ever born to a woman
varies with her level of schooling. I will impose weak assumptions on the data-generating
process that are consistent with the related literature. These assumptions are also consis-
tent with the PMIV assumptions, as discussed below. However, compared to most previous
analyses, I will neither make distributional or functional form assumptions, nor invoke strong
independence or exclusion restrictions. Instead, I will discuss the implications of the PMIV
assumptions on the counterfactual distributions of interest.
Unfortunately, economic theory alone does not provide a clear-cut prediction on the sign of
the correlation between education and fertility. In the traditional perspective, more educated
women face higher opportunity costs of childbearing, which on average reduces the expected
number of children, but they also tend to have higher wages, and/or a higher educated partner
with a higher income (Becker 1991, Pollak andWatkins 1993), which may contribute to a higher
fertility of the more educated women (although the latter conclusion is not without debate,
see for example Becker and Lewis 1973 for a discussion on the quality-quantity aspect). In
addition, higher educated women tend to postpone their marriage and fertility decisions, they
tend to have different views about family formation and female autonomy, and also tend to
have a better knowledge about fertility control (Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984, Rosenzweig and
Schultz 1985, Mason 1986, Schultz 1993, Cheng and Nwachukwu 1997, Lam and Duryea 1999,
Basu 2002, Bratti 2003), which are all factors that may reduce the number of children of the
more educated women.
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The empirical findings on the correlation between education and fertility mainly point to a
negative sign (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1985, Easterlin 1987, Becker 1991, Sander 1992, Schultz
1993, Lam and Duryea 1999). However, some studies provide evidence in favor of a positive
association (e.g., Moffitt 1984), although the effects are weakly significant or insignificant.
In the following analysis, I will combine the results from the above cited literature (mainly
the model of Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984) with the literature on fertility expectations and
ideal family size (e.g., Blake 1974, Coombs 1978, Ajzen (1985), and Schoen et al. 1999). In
this view, fertility decisions follow a sequential process and the effect of schooling depends on
the actual number of children. The higher educated women more often stay childless than the
lower educated women, on average. However, given already one child, i.e., the decision in favor
of getting children, the higher educated women will on average be better able to achieve ideal
family size goals. In the US, where the employed data come from, this amounts to an ideal
of two children (the median and modal value over time). Thus, the decision for one child as
opposed to two or more children is more likely for the low educated women than for the high
educated women, but the conditional transition probabilities for the second and more children
will be higher for the more than the lower educated women. Formally,
P (Y (s) = 0|S = u1) ≤ P (Y (s) = 0|S = u2)
P (Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S = u1) ≥ P (Y (s) = 1|Y (s) ≥ 1, S = u2)
P (Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, S = u1) ≤ P (Y (s) = y|Y (s) ≥ y, S = u2), y ≥ 2
where Y (s) is the number of children if the woman were to receive s years of schooling, S is
the realized schooling, and u1 < u2.
The data used for the analysis are taken from the General Social Survey (GSS) 1972-2008
(see the website of the National Opinion Research Center www.norc.org for further details on
the data). I restrict attention to the (sub-) population of white women aged 55-70 that are
not in the labor force. Table 2 gives the estimates of the schooling distribution in a sample of
2,976 randomly selected women from this population, with the schooling variable aggregated
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to four categories: less than 12 years, 12 years, 13-15 years, and 16 or more years of schooling.
— Insert Table 2 about here —
The estimates of the conditional transition probabilities in the fertility distribution, for
given levels of schooling, are also shown in Table 2 (the numbers of observations used to
estimate each quantity are provided in square brackets). The observed drop-out rates (fertility
transitions) tend to increase with the education level for each but the first child. This may
be interpreted as an indicator for the imposed PMTS assumptions, though it cannot be used
as a test because the estimated numbers are based on the observed instead of the potential
outcomes. Stronger assumptions on the relationship between schooling and the number of
children would be necessary in order to conduct a valid test of the (combined) assumptions.
Figure 7 shows the estimated potential outcome distributions for each of the four schooling
categories. The horizontal axes display the number of children y, where 5 and more children
are summarized into a single category, and the vertical axes display the according probabilities
P [Y (s) = y]. Using the empirical evidence alone the potential outcome probabilities can only
be bounded with the estimated range being marked by the light grey bars.
— Insert Figure 7 about here —
The bounds under the PMTS assumptions are indicated by the black bars. For comparison,
the bounds obtained under the MTS assumption (with weak inequality for the transition
from one child reversed) are indicated by the grey bars. Imposing these assumptions does
substantially narrow the no-assumptions bounds, although point identification of any of the
potential outcome probabilities is not achieved. The shrinkage in the estimated range depends
on the schooling and the outcome level. The lower PMTS bound for outcomes greater than
or equal to two is always zero since, by assumption, the lower bound on at least one of the
conditional transitions is zero in these cases. The lowering of the upper PMTS bound is the
greater, the more the lower bound on the conditional transitions in the previous steps is raised.
Nonparametric bounds on the treatment effects, if defined as the differences in the outcome
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distributions, can be derived from these graphs by taking differences between the according
bars. If the only information imposed on the data-generating process is the PMTS structure,
then the bounds in Figure 7 are sharp (noting the additional variation that arises due to
sampling error). Tighter bounds on the counterfactual distributions can only be obtained by
imposing stronger assumptions.
5 Conclusion
Manski and Pepper (2000) discuss monotone instrumental variables in order to relax common
IV assumptions. In a nutshell, the equality of mean responses is replaced by a weak inequality
conditional on the variation in the instrument (under suitable order conditions). While the
MIV assumptions generally do not point-identify the potential outcome distribution, they
can be successfully explored to derive informative bounds. Manski and Pepper point to the
extension of their MIV idea to stochastic dominance. To the best of my knowledge, this paper
is the first that investigates the MIV concept in the context of a sequentially ordered outcome
process, thereby exploring a particular form of stochastic dominance.
Assuming that agents make decisions under a sequential update of information, the paper
applies the MIV idea in order to impose weak stochastic dominance on the conditional tran-
sition probabilities. Reflecting the sequential order, the sign of stochastic dominance might
depend on the outcome level itself. This concept is well-founded in economic demand models
with heterogenous preferences and where income and substitution effects interact. Since the
paper does not impose independence assumptions or exclusion restrictions, the results derived
above have implications for a large number of applications where no such assumptions can
be credibly imposed, but where a sequential process can be motivated and weak information
about the direction of effects is available.
Further research might combine some sort of (weak) independence condition with the struc-
tural model imposed in Section 4 in order to gain further insights on the sign of the inequalities
in the PMIV assumptions. Moreover, two issues should receive attention regarding inference.
22
First, the potential finite sample bias in the analogue estimates needs to be appropriately cor-
rected (see also Kreider and Pepper 2007, Manski and Pepper 2009). Second, the uncertainty
in the sign of the weak inequalities in the PMIV assumptions must be accounted for in order
to derive confidence intervals with a pre-defined coverage probability.
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Figures and Tables
Table 1: Design Simulation Study
α σν,1 σν,2 σ1,2 τ1,1 τ1,2
Figure 1 -2 to 2 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 0
2 0 -0.5 to 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0
3 0 0.3 -0.5 to 0.5 0.4 0.8 0
4 0 0.3 0.5 -0.5 to 0.5 0.5 0
5 0 0.3 0.5 0.4 -2 to 2 0
6 0 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 -2 to 2
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Table 2: Schooling and Fertility - Empirical Distribution Functions
Years of schooling (S)
≤ 11 12 13-15 ≥ 16
P (S) 0.364 0.367 0.160 0.109
[1,082] [1,092] [476] [326]
Conditional transitions in the fertility distribution
P (Y = 0|S) 0.106 0.127 0.149 0.221
[1,082] [1,092] [476] [326]
P (Y = 1|Y ≥ 1, S) 0.155 0.162 0.131 0.126
[967] [953] [405] [254]
P (Y = 2|Y ≥ 2, S) 0.285 0.362 0.367 0.441
[817] [799] [352] [222]
P (Y = 3|Y ≥ 3, S) 0.355 0.488 0.498 0.629
[584] [510] [223] [124]
P (Y = 4|Y ≥ 4, S) 0.377 0.529 0.580 0.522
[377] [261] [112] [46]
Source: GSS 1972-2008, own calculations. Notes: The estimates are based on
a random sample of 2,976 observations on white women aged 55-70 not in the
labor force. The numbers of observations used to estimate each probability
are reported in square brackets. Y denotes the number of children.
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Figure 1: Bounds on Potential Outcome Distributions – Variation of α
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome probability P [Y (s) = y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Proposition 1/Corollary 1 under the partial monotone
treatment selection (PMTS) assumptions.
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Figure 2: Bounds on Potential Outcome Distributions – Variation of σν,1
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome probability P [Y (s) = y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Proposition 1/Corollary 1 under the partial monotone
treatment selection (PMTS) assumptions. For comparison, the graph also shows the bounds obtained if a
monotone treatment selection (MTS) assumption is imposed (dark diamonds).
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Figure 3: Bounds on Potential Outcome Distributions – Variation of σν,2
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome probability P [Y (s) = y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Proposition 1/Corollary 1 under the partial monotone
treatment selection (PMTS) assumptions. For comparison, the graph also shows the bounds obtained if a
monotone treatment selection (MTS) assumption is imposed (dark diamonds).
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Figure 4: Bounds on Potential Outcome Distributions – Variation of σ1,2
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome probability P [Y (s) = y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Proposition 1/Corollary 1 under the partial monotone
treatment selection (PMTS) assumptions.
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Figure 5: Bounds on Potential Outcome Distributions – Variation of τ1,1
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome probability P [Y (s) = y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Proposition 1/Corollary 1 under the partial monotone
treatment selection (PMTS) assumptions.
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Figure 6: Bounds on Potential Outcome Distributions – Variation of τ1,2
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Notes: Thick black lines denote the true potential outcome probability P [Y (s) = y] as indicated on the vertical
axes, small grey triangles (circles) denote the no-assumptions upper (lower) bounds, large hollow triangles
(circles) denote the upper (lower) bounds as derived in Proposition 1/Corollary 1 under the partial monotone
treatment selection (PMTS) assumptions.
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Figure 7: Bounds on the Distribution of the Number of Children by Schooling Level
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Source: GSS 1972-2008, own calculations. Notes: P [Y (1) = y] denotes the potential distribution of the number
of children if everybody in the population (defined as white women aged 55-70 years not in the labor force)
was observed with an education level of less than 12 years. P [Y (2) = y] denotes the same distribution if
everybody was observed with 12 years of schooling, P [Y (3) = y] with 13-15 years of schooling, and P [Y (4) = y]
with 16 years or more, respectively. Left bars are obtained using the empirical evidence alone, middle bars
are obtained under partial monotone treatment selection (PMTS) assumptions imposing that the potential
conditional transition probabilities are higher (lower) for the high educated than the low educated women for
the outcome levels 0, (1), 2, 3, and 4. Outcome 5m stands for 5 or more children. Right bars are obtained
under the presumption of monotone treatment selection (MTS) with the transition probabilities higher for the
high eductated women over the entire support of Y .
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